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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 34A-l-303(2)(b); 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(7); and 34A-2-801(8)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the medical records exhibit was sufficiently exhaustive 
and properly relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission 
when denying Benson's request for permanent total disability benefits.1 
Standard of Review: 
This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation and 
application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-1(H) which 
governs the form and creation of the medical records exhibit. As such, the 
applicable standard of review is reasonableness and rationality, also known as 
abuse of discretion. Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 855 P.2d 267, 
269-70 (Utah App 1993). See also, Nucor Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 
1294, 1296 (Utah 1992); Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. Tax 
Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah App. 1993). 
Issue 2: Whether the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission 
abused their discretion by denying Benson's permanent total disability claim 
without submitting the question of causation to a medical panel. 
This issue encompasses issues 1, 2, 4, and 6 raised in Benson's brief. 
2
 This issue encompasses issues 3 and 5 raised in Benson's brief. 
1 
Standard of Review: 
This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation and 
application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-2 which 
governs the utilization of medical panels. As such, the applicable standard of 
review is that of reasonableness and rationality, as explained above. 
This issue also involves a challenge to the agency's determination that there 
was not a significant difference of medical opinion concerning the cause of 
Benson's left knee injury. This is a question of fact and the agency's factual 
determination should be upheld so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. 
Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 
(Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statutes and rules may be found in their entirety in 
Addendum A. Their citations are Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l); Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-601; Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(H); Utah Administrative 
Code R602-2-2. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellee, Lucent Technologies ("Lucent")3, respectfully requests that 
this Court uphold the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") and 
Labor Commission ("the Commission") below to deny the Appellant, Ron 
Benson's request for permanent total compensation benefits. 
The Appellant in this case, Ron Benson ("Benson"), is a college educated 
former employee of Lucent Technologies. (R. Vol. 4 at 38.) He has held a wide 
variety of jobs with Lucent, including managerial and "desk job" positions. (R. 
Vol. 4. at 35-38.) This case arises due to an industrial accident in which Benson 
was injured while in the employ of Lucent. (R. Vol. 4 at 9.) On October 3rd 1997, 
Benson visited a job site as part of his duties as a field services manager. (R. Vol. 
4 at 9.) While at the site, another individual accidentally pulled a large stack of 
industrial grade sheetrock over onto Benson, which struck his feet and legs. (R. 
Vol. 4 at 11; Vol. 2 at 3.) 
Benson was taken to the emergency room at Alta View Hospital. (R. Vol. 
4 at 13.) At the emergency room he reported that he had twisted his right foot, 
landed on his right knee and foot, and that a piece of sheetrock had landed on his 
left foot. (R. Vol. 2 at 11.) He said he had pain and swelling in the right foot, 
with minimal pain in the left, and denied any ankle pain, knee pain, or other 
injuries. (R. Vol. 2 at 11.) X-rays showed a fracture in the right foot, but no 
3
 Benson inadvertently failed to include Lucent as a defendant in the case caption. 
However, Lucent is made a party by operation of Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-
801(8)(b)(i). 
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injuries to the left. (R. Vol. 2 at 12.) Benson was placed in a right foot splint, 
given crutches and a prescription for Lortab, told to ice and elevate his foot, and 
finally discharged. (R. Vol. 2 at 12.) Shortly thereafter, Benson began treating 
with Dr. Gordon and eventually underwent surgery on his right foot on November 
5, 1997. (R. Vol. 2 at 137.) Benson's recovery from surgery went well and he 
was released to work on January 26, 1998. (R. Vol. 2 at 140; Vol. 4 at 16.) He 
was compensated for his medical treatment and temporary total disability for the 
entirety of his time off work. (R. Vol. 4 at 16; R. Vol. 1 at 68.) 
Due to his injury, Benson's doctor restricted him to jobs involving seated 
positions. (R. Vol. 4 at 16.) Lucent accommodated Benson's restrictions and 
brought him back as a serialization manager, a position that allowed him to stay 
off his feet. (R. Vol. 4 at 36.) After working for nearly a year as a serialization 
manager, and contrary to his doctor's restrictions, Benson accepted a position as 
an assistant consultant. (R. Vol. 4 at 17.) The new position required much more 
time on his feet and aggravated Benson's injury. (R. Vol. 4 at 17.) After about 
five months, and at the request of Benson's doctor, Benson was made a resource 
scheduler, a position that was largely a desk job. (R. Vol. 4 at 19.) 
Nearly three years after Benson had returned to work from his injury, and 
after working as a resource scheduler for over a year, Lucent offered numerous 
people and job positions an early retirement package. (R. Vol. 4 at 20.) Benson 
accepted early retirement and his last day of work was September 29, 2000. (R. 
Vol. 4 at 20.) 
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Course of Proceedings 
On June 2nd, 2004, Benson filed an application for hearing with the Utah 
Labor Commission requesting compensation for permanent total disability arising 
from his October 3rd, 1997 accident. (R. Vol. 1 at 2.) During the discovery 
period leading up to the hearing, Benson attended an independent medical 
examination and functional capacity evaluation at Lucent's request. At Benson's 
evidentiary hearing on April 24, 2005, Benson's counsel unexpectedly made an 
impromptu motion to have Lucent's medical and functional capacity expert reports 
excluded because they were submitted to Benson's attorney later than 45 days 
prior to the hearing as technically required by the Labor Commission rules. (R. 
Vol. 4 at 3.) The ALJ granted the motion and the reports were excluded. (R. Vol. 
4 at 7.) 
On April 28, 2005, the ALJ released her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order concerning Benson's claims of permanent total impairment. (R. 
Vol. 1 at 67.) She found that Benson had failed to prove that he was unable to 
perform his former work as a scheduler for Lucent, that he had failed to prove that 
he was unable to perform other work that was reasonably available, and that he 
had failed to prove that his industrial injury was the direct cause of his permanent 
total disability. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.) Because Benson had failed to prove essential 
elements of his claims, the ALJ did not address any remaining issues. (R. Vol. 1 
at 71.) 
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On May 25, 2005, Benson appealed the ALJ's decision to the Labor 
Commissioner. (R. Vol. 1 at 74.) In his appeal, Benson argued that the 
Commissioner should review four attached documents that he had not included in 
the medical record exhibit (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "MRE"). (R. 
Vol. 1 at 74.) Lucent's memorandum in opposition to review argued that Lucent 
had never received the additional records and that Benson should have produced 
them before the MRE was compiled. (R. Vol. 1 at 81-82.) Lucent also noted that 
two of its own medical reports had been excluded from the MRE based on 
timeliness objections, and argued that it would be patently unfair to allow Benson 
to add previously undisclosed documents to the MRE after the hearing when 
Lucent had not been allowed to add records to the MRE that had been disclosed 
prior to the hearing. (R. Vol 1 at 81-82.) 
On January 10, 2006, the Commissioner issued an order denying Benson's 
motion for review. (R. Vol. 1 at 85.) The Commissioner refused to consider 
Benson's additional documents because they were not submitted in the timeframe 
required by statute. (R. Vol. 1 at 85.) In a footnote, the Commissioner added that 
even if the Commission were to consider the additional evidence proffered by 
Benson, it would not have changed the decision because the more persuasive 
evidence was already in the record. (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) The Commissioner adopted 
the ALJ's finding of fact and held that Benson was not permanently and totally 
disabled, and that even if he was, his industrial accident was not the cause. (R. 
Vol. 1 at 86.) 
On March 10, 2006, Benson filed a request for reconsideration with the 
Commissioner. Benson's request included approximately 71 pages of additional 
documents that Benson asked the Commission to review. (R. Vol. 1 at 96.) 
Lucent argued that Benson's documents were irrelevant because they did not 
address the facts that the ALJ had relied upon to arrive at her ruling on the Motion 
for Review, and that most of the additional documents were not appropriate for 
inclusion into the MRE in any case. (R. Vol. 1 at 186-188.) Lucent also argued 
that any omissions in the MRE were created by Benson's failure to include the 
records in a timely fashion, and that as such they should be excluded for failure to 
comply with statutory guidelines. (R. Vol. 1 at 186-188.) 
The Labor Commission denied Benson's request for reconsideration on 
March 31, 2006. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should find that ALJ and Labor Commission did not abuse their 
discretion by relying on the MRE as it existed at the time of the evidentiary 
hearing or by not submitting the question of causation concerning Benson's left 
knee injury to a medical panel. 
Benson argues that there were significant omissions and errors in the MRE 
that lead the ALJ and Commission to err in their determination that he was not 
entitled to benefits for permanent total disability. However, the ALJ and 
Commission were correct in relying on the MRE because any omissions in the 
record were caused by Benson's failure to include records that were in his 
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possession. Furthermore, the additional documents that Benson wanted to add to 
the MRE did not address the primary facts that the ALJ and Commission relied 
upon to deny Benson's claim, thus their omission was irrelevant. Finally, 
Benson's contention that the MRE was flawed as a whole due to organizational 
errors fails because the mere misfiling of records in the MRE, without a showing 
that the misfilings 
prejudiced Benson, is not sufficient to invalidate the MRE. 
Benson also argues that the ALJ and the Labor Commission should have 
submitted the question of causation concerning his left knee injury to a medical 
panel because there were conflicting medical opinions regarding causation. 
However, the ALJ and the Commission were correct in not convening a medical 
panel because the cause of Benson's left knee injury was irrelevant due to the fact 
that he had failed to prove that he was totally disabled. Additionally, the ALJ did 
not abuse her discretion by failing to analyze all of the issues surrounding 
Benson's claim for benefits once she determined that his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits had failed. Finally, there were no significant conflicts of 
medical opinion concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury, and even if 
there had been, such conflicts were irrelevant to the issue of permanent and total 
disability. 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court should find that the Labor Commission did not abuse its 
discretion by relying on the medical records exhibit as it existed at the time of the 
evidentiary hearing, and that it did not abuse its discretion by not convening a 
medical panel to determine the cause of Benson's left knee injury. Before 
addressing the main points raised in Benson's argument, Lucent would like to 
address two issues related to difficulties that have arisen in interpreting and 
answering Benson's brief. 
First, where a briefs overall analysis is so lacking that it shifts the burden 
of research and argument to the Court, the Court need not even consider it. 
Morgan v. Labor Com'n, 2003 Utah App 293. While Lucent appreciates the 
difficulties faced by a pro se appellant, Benson's brief is devoid of almost any 
relevant legal analysis. His arguments are largely bald assertions that lack a 
foundation in law or fact, and his brief is structured in such a way that it requires 
the reader to guess at the topics he addresses and the arguments he makes. Lucent 
has spent considerable time and effort extracting and organizing the seemingly 
random collection of arguments contained in Benson's brief. It is not the Court's 
responsibility to guess at the arguments and structure of a brief, and as such, it 
would seem entirely appropriate for this Court to not even consider the merits of 
Benson's arguments and deny his appeal as inadequately briefed. Id, 
Second, the issues addressed by Lucent in this brief represent a good faith 
effort to distill and organize the arguments raised by Benson in his appeal. It is 
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Lucent's understanding that Benson has not directly challenged any of the 
Commission's findings of fact other than its finding that there were not significant 
conflicting opinions concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury. Benson's 
arguments focus largely on alleged deficiencies in the medical records exhibit and 
the Commission's failure to completely review the MRE. To the extent that this 
Court finds that Benson has challenged findings of fact, it must uphold the 
Commission's findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). Lucent 
contends that the record as a whole contains substantial evidence sufficient to 
support all of the Commission's factual findings. 
Additionally, Benson failed to marshal evidence as required to challenge a 
finding of fact. A party challenging a lower court's findings of fact has the burden 
of establishing that those findings are not supported by the evidence. Cambelt Int' 
Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). To successfully challenge a 
trial court's findings of fact on appeal, an appellant must list all the evidence 
supporting the findings and then show that the evidence is inadequate to sustain 
the findings, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the court below. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). "If the appellant fails to 
marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). In 
this case, Benson has not even attempted to marshal the evidence. Therefore, to 
the extent that Benson challenges the Labor Commission's factual findings, such 
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challenge must be rejected, and this Court should hold that the record supports the 
findings of the Labor Commission below. 
POINT 1 
THE LABOR COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY RELYING ON THE MEDICAL RECORDS EXHIBIT AS IT 
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING. 
A. The Labor Commission Was Correct in Refusing to Review 
Additional Documents Proffered by Benson After the Evidentiary 
Hearing Because Any Omissions in the Medical Records Exhibit 
Were the Result of Benson's Own Failure to Include Documents 
That Were in His Possession. 
The Commission's reliance on the medical records exhibit was not an abuse 
of discretion because any omissions in the record were caused by Benson's own 
failure to include documents he had in his possession long before the evidentiary 
hearing. The creation of the MRE is governed by Utah Administrative Code Rule 
R602-2-l(H), which states: 
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records during 
the discovery period 
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained 
in his/her possession to the respondent for the preparation of a 
joint medical records exhibit at least twenty (20) working 
days prior to the scheduled hearing. 
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit 
containing all relevant medical records. The medical record 
exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that tend to 
prove or disprove a fact in issue. Hospital nurses' notes, 
duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need not 
be included in the medical records exhibit. 
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by 
medical care provider in chronological order and bound. 
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5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall 
be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or petitioner's 
counsel at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. Late-filed 
medical records may or may not be admitted at the discretion 
of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good 
cause shown. 
Under this statutory scheme, the petitioner in a workers' compensation case 
has the responsibility to provide the respondent with all of the medical records that 
the petitioner wants included in the record. The respondent then compiles the 
MRE and delivers it to the petitioner at least ten days prior to the hearing; ample 
time for the petitioner to review the record for accuracy and completeness. If any 
records have been omitted, the petitioner may request that they be added to the 
record. This is generally accomplished between the parties previous to the hearing, 
although it is not unusual for an ALJ to allow previously disclosed records into the 
MRE at the hearing. Additional records may be admitted at the discretion of the 
ALJ if good cause is shown. 
In this matter, Benson has not shown good cause to allow additional 
records to be admitted. He provided a number of records to Lucent previous to the 
evidentiary hearing, all of which were incorporated into the MRE. The MRE was 
delivered for inspection to Benson's attorney before the hearing. Benson did not 
request that additional records be added to the MRE either before or during the 
hearing. Instead, Benson signaled that he expected strict adherence to the 
Administrative Rules by moving to have both of Lucent's expert reports excluded 
because Lucent had not served its pretrial disclosures a full 45 days previous to the 
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hearing as technically required by Rule 602-2-1(I)(3). Benson's motion was 
successful and Lucent's expert reports were excluded from the MRE. 
In his motion for review, Benson attempted to submit four pages of 
additional documents for review, but did not explain why the additional 
documents had not been included in the MRE prior to the hearing. (R. Vol. 1 at 
74.) In Benson's request for reconsideration, in which he attempted to submit 
even more new documents, he stated several times that his former attorney had not 
given him the opportunity to review the MRE before his hearing. (R. Vol. 1 at 
105.) He seems to imply that his attorney was at fault for not including the 
additional documents. (R. Vol. 1 at 105, 109.) Finally, in his appellate brief, 
Benson claims that he gave the additional documents to his attorney well in 
advance of the creation of the MRE and suggests that his attorney did not forward 
them to Lucent for inclusion in the MRE. (Appellant's Brief at 5.) Benson also 
suggests that Allen may have given the additional documents, which were 
apparently derived from Benson's request for Social Security benefits, to Lucent's 
attorney, but that Lucent instead included documents that it had obtained directly 
from the Social Security Administration.4 (Appellant's Brief at 5.) 
No matter what explanation is forwarded by Benson, the only relevant fact 
is that Benson apparently failed to review the MRE prior to the evidentiary 
4
 Lucent does not have a clear understanding why Benson believes that the 
documents he obtained from his doctor and submitted to the Social Security 
Administration are different from those that Lucent obtained directly from the 
Social Security Administration. Lucent is not aware of any facts that would 
suggest the documents were different. 
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hearing. If Benson feels that this is the fault of his attorney, he should raise that 
issue with him. Clearly, Lucent fulfilled its statutory duty to compile the MRE 
and then submitted it to Benson for his inspection. Lucent cannot be expected to 
include documents that it had not received, nor does Lucent or the Commission 
have a duty to ensure that Benson reviewed the MRE before the hearing. The 
Commissioner noted that the additional documents Benson proffered were 
prepared well in advance of the evidentiary hearing and that he had failed to 
explain why he did not include them in the MRE. (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) As such, the 
Commission declined to consider them because they had not been submitted in 
accordance to the statutory requirements. (R. Vol. 1 at 85, 86.) Finally, it would 
be patently unfair to allow Benson to include additional documents in the MRE 
after he had successfully petitioned the ALJ to exclude Lucent's expert reports for 
violating similar technical timing requirements. (R. Vol. 4 at 7.) For these 
reasons, Lucent asks this Court to find that the Commission did not abuse its 
discretion by not reviewing additional documentation proffered by Benson after 
the evidentiary hearing. 
B. The Medical RecoicK luliilnl Pit! ,Nn( iiiiliidv A nv Significant 
Omissions. 
As stated previously, the Labor Commission acted properly in refusing 
Benson's request to supplement the MRE. However, even if this decision were 
improper, it would be immaterial to the denial of Benson's permanent total 
disability claim because the MRE did not include any significant omissions. 
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Benson criticizes the MRE for being incomplete and it appears that the focus 
of his argument is the 58 pages of documents he attached to his Request for 
Reconsideration to the Commissioner. (R. Vol. 1 at 96.) Many of the 
documents in question are not appropriate for the MRE? given that they are 
correspondence, bills, and other documents that are not "medical records." 
Furthermore, the additional documents do not change the basic facts that 
are already set forth in the MRE. The "omitted" documents largely reiterate 
the undisputed fact that Benson suffered a serious workplace injury. Some of 
the documents reflect Dr. Watson's opinion that Benson's depression and 
anxiety symptoms were caused by the industrial accident. However, these 
same points were already made in the records that were included in the medical 
records exhibit (R. Vol. 3 at 392, 394.) Additionally, Dr. Watson's opinion 
that Benson's alleged depression, anxiety, chronic pain, and sleep problems are 
related to his industrial accident is already presented, although admittedly 
misfiled, in the MRE. (R. Vol. 3 at 469.) Thus, in this regard, the records 
Benson seeks to add are merely redundant, as noted by the Commissioner in 
his denial of the request for reconsideration. 
Moreover, the additional records do not address the reasons that the ALJ 
and Commission cited when denying Benson's request for benefits. The ALJ held 
that Benson had not proved that he was unable to perform his former work as a 
scheduler, that he had not proved that he was unable to perform other work 
reasonably available, and that he had not proved that his industrial accident was 
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the direct cause of his permanent total disability. These holdings were based 
largely on the fact that he was able to perform his job duties for several years 
before leaving Lucent, that he only left Lucent once he was offered early 
retirement, and that he has the education and experience to perform sedentary 
office work. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.) The Commission agreed with the ALJ and 
added that "[e]ven if the Commission were to consider the evidence proffered by 
Mr. Benson, such evidence would not change the Commission's decision. The 
more persuasive evidence already in the record convinces the Commission that Mr. 
Benson is not permanently and totally disabled within the meaning of the Act." (R. 
Vol. 1 at 86.) 
None of Benson's additional documents dispute or negate the facts that the 
ALJ and the Commission relied upon in denying Benson's request for permanent 
total disability. Thus, their omission from the MRE was irrelevant and 
insignificant. Because the omissions in the MRE are not critical, this Court should 
find that the ALJ and the Commission did not abuse their discretion by relying on 
the MRE as it existed at the time of the evidentiary hearing to deny Benson's 
request for permanent total impairment compensation. 
C. The Commission Did Not Abuse its Discretion By Relying on the 
Medical Record Exhibit Despite its Organizational Problems. 
The Commission's reliance on the MRE was not an abuse of discretion 
despite the record's organizational problems. Benson has exhaustively 
documented every misfiling in the MRE, most of which relate to a group of 
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documents that were inadvertently filed under tab eight, which was intended for 
records from the University of Utah Pain Management Center. However, he has 
not demonstrated that these errors affected how the Labor Commission decided his 
case. 
Benson had ample opportunity to review the MRE prior to his evidentiary 
hearing. If he had concerns about the state of the MRE's organization, he should 
have voiced them prior to the hearing. Instead, his silence on the subject acted as 
an implicit ratification of the MRE, misfilings and all. 
Benson has not cited any law suggesting that the misfilings in an MRE in 
and of themselves invalidate the entire record. If that were the case, many MREs 
would likely be deemed invalid. More importantly, he has not cited any evidence 
indicating that the ALJ or the Commission had any difficulty navigating the MRE. 
The unintentional misfiling of documents in the MRE is similar to an "Exhibit A" 
attached to a motion being accidentally identified as "Exhibit B" in the argument 
portion of the motion, or similar minor lapses and missteps that occur all the time 
in litigation documents notwithstanding exhaustive proofreading. Without 
evidence that he was somehow prejudiced by the misfilings, or that the 
Commission missed important evidence due to the misfilings, they cannot be 
viewed as anything more serious than unfortunate but inconsequential mistakes 
that did not affect the outcome of the case. 
The mere fact that organizational errors exist in the MRE is not sufficient to 
invalidate the exhibit, and without evidence of a negative effect on Benson's claim, 
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there is no reason to assume that the Commission abused its discretion by relying 
on the MRE despite its imperfections. This Court should find that the Commission 
and ALJ did not abuse their discretion by relying on the MRE notwithstanding its 
misfilings because Benson had the opportunity to review the MRE before it was 
submitted at the evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence that Benson was 
prejudiced due to the misfilings, and there is no evidence that the misfilings 
effected the Commission's ability to find the important records upon which its 
decisions were based. 
D. The Record Shows That the Administrative Law Judge and Labor 
Commission Reviewed and Understood the Medical Record. 
Throughout his brief, Benson alleges that the ALJ and the Commission did 
not review the entire MRE, misunderstood the MRE, or purposefully ignored 
portions of the MRE so that they could rule against his claim. These unfounded 
allegations are not supported by the record. 
Benson has not cited a single piece of evidence that suggesting that the ALJ 
or the Commission failed to properly review the evidence. Instead, his brief cites, 
ad nauseum, to pages of evidence that were submitted to the ALJ in the MRE. His 
circular reasoning appears to be that if the ALJ and the Commission had seen this 
evidence they could not have possibly denied his request for benefits, so because 
they denied his request for benefits they must not have reviewed the cited 
evidence. However, in their denial of Benson's request for review, the 
Commissioner stated that he denied Benson's claims because "the more persuasive 
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evidence already in the record convinces the Commission that Mr. Benson is not 
permanently and totally disabled." (R. Vol. 1 at 86.) Despite Benson's incredulity 
that the Commission could arrive at such a conclusion in the face of what he views 
as irrefutable evidence, it is clear that the issue is not that the Commission did not 
review Benson's evidence, but rather that it found other evidence to be more 
persuasive. 
The decisions released by the ALJ and the Commission in this case make 
it clear that Benson's evidence was carefully reviewed. In her decision, the ALJ 
addressed all of the ailments that Benson claims to have made him permanently 
and totally disabled, including his right foot and leg, left knee, insomnia, 
depression, stress, anxiety, and restless leg syndrome. (R. Vol. 1 at 68.) She also 
addressed other considerations, such as Dr. Barbuto's determination that Benson 
had "obvious pain behaviors of a psychosocial type" accompanied by "frequent 
wincing and melodrama in his movements." (R. Vol. 1 at 69.) Further, the ALJ 
noted that Benson had worked for nearly three years after the accident and 
continued to be qualified and able to hold an office job involving sedentary work 
responsibilities. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.) 
There is no question that one of the primary duties of the ALJ is to weigh 
the evidence and assess its credibility. Martin v. La-Z-Bov, Inc., 2004 UT App 31. 
The fact that the ALJ arrived at a decision that Benson does not agree with does 
not indicate that his evidence was not reviewed. Rather, it merely indicates that 
the evidence was weighed and that the judge found the evidence opposing 
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Benson's claim to be more credible than that supporting his claim. Based on 
Benson's total lack of evidence supporting his argument that the ALJ and 
Commission failed to review the MRE in its entirety, and the comprehensive 
review of the evidence found in the ALJ's and Commission's findings of fact, 
Lucent requests that this Court rule that the Commission did not abuse its 
discretion in reviewing the MRE, and interpreting the evidence therein. 
POINT 2 
THE ADMINSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND LABOR 
COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION BY NOT 
SUBMITING THE CASE TO A MEDICAL PANEL. 
A. The Labor Commission Did Not Need to Submit the Case to a 
Medical Panel Because Benson Failed to Prove That He was 
Permanently and Totally Disabled. 
The entirety of the argument portion of Benson's brief deals with his 
contentions that the ALJ and Labor Commission erred in their determination that 
Benson's permanent total disability was not caused by his industrial accident. He 
believes this error was either caused by missing/overlooked documents in the 
MRE or the ALJ's failure to submit the case to a medical panel to determine 
causation. However, Benson's zeal in arguing causation is misplaced because he 
failed to first prove that he has been permanently and totally disabled. 
To be successful in a claim for permanent total impairment, the petitioner 
must prove three things. First, he must show that he "sustained a significant 
impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement." 
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Second, he must show that "he is permanently totally disabled." Finally, the 
petitioner must show that "the industrial accident or occupational disease was the 
direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability." Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-413(])(b). 
The ALJ's findings of fact, which were later adopted by the Labor 
Commission, specifically stated that Benson had failed to prove that his injuries 
prevented him from performing his former job at Lucent or other readily available 
work for which he was qualified. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71). In other words, Benson 
failed to satisfy his burden of proof that he was permanently and totally disabled. 
Without a finding of total impairment, there is no need to consider the issue of 
causation. In fact, it is impossible to establish that total impairment was caused by 
a particular accident when total impairment has not been proven. Because it is 
impossible to establish the causation of an injury that has not been proven, the 
ALJ and Commission did not abuse their discretion by failing to submit the 
question of causation to a medical panel. 
B. The Administrative Law Judge Did Not Violate Benson's Rights by 
Failing to Review Additional Aspects of Benson's Case After She 
Had Determined That Benson Had Failed to Establish Essential 
Elements of His Claim. 
Benson asserts that the ALJ violated his rights by stating in her ruling that 
"[b]ecause the petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving these aspects of 
his case, the remaining issues related to the claim need not be addressed." 
Appellants Brief at 9. Tellingly, Benson does not provide any reasons or support 
?1 
as to why he believes this is the case. In actuality, the ALJ did not need to 
continue her analysis once she determined that Benson's claim had not been 
proven. 
In her findings of fact, the ALJ found that Benson had failed to prove that 
he was permanently and totally disabled and that he had failed to prove that his 
industrial accident had caused his permanent disability. (R. Vol. 1 at 70-71.) 
Such showings are required in order to prevail in a claim for permanent total 
disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b). Without such showings, Benson's 
claim could not be succeed. At the point that Benson's claim failed, further 
analysis of other issues related to the claim was superfluous. Therefore, once the 
ALJ had determined that Benson was not entitled to permanent total disability, she 
did not violate Benson's rights by refusing to examine any additional issues that 
may have been related to his claim. 
C. There Were No Significant Conflicting Opinions Concerning the 
Causation of Benson's Disabilities. 
Benson argues that the ALJ and Commission abused their discretion by not 
submitting the question of causation to a medical panel. Specifically, Benson 
argues that the question of whether his left knee injury was caused by his 
industrial accident should have been submitted to a panel.5 As noted supra, the 
5
 Benson's issue number three asks generally whether the judge erred by "not 
convening a medical panel when there is a conflict in medical opinions." 
However, it appears that this issue is specifically related to the causation of his left 
knee injury. On page 8 of his brief, Benson cites Utah Administrative Code Rule 
602-2-2(A)(l), which deals specifically with the question of causation. On the 
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issue of causation is irrelevant unless total impairment has been established. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Benson had established total impairment, 
the ALJ still did not abuse its discretion by ruling on the question of causation 
without the assistance of a medical panel. 
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601 gives the Labor Commission discretion 
whether to appoint a medical panel. However, the Commission has also adopted 
Administrative Rule R602-2-2, which states that a medical panel must be utilized 
if there are significant medical issues demonstrated by conflicting medical 
opinions concerning important topics such as those "related to causation of the 
injury." The Utah Supreme Court has summarized this rule (then numbered as 
R568-1-9) and explained the standard of review concerning its application as 
follows: 
This rule requires the ALJ to submit the case to a medical panel 
when "[one or more significant medical issues may be involved." A 
significant medical issue must generally be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Thus, referral to a medical panel is mandatory only 
where there is a medical controversy as evidenced through 
conflicting medical reports. Whether there are conflicting medical 
reports is a question of fact. We must uphold the Commission's 
factual findings if such findings are supported by substantial 
evidence based upon the record as a while. When reviewing the 
Commission's application of its own rules, this Court will not 
disturb the agency's interpretation or application of one of the 
same page, Benson cites the ALJ's statement in her Findings of Fact that "Dr. 
Gordon disagreed with Dr. Zeluff as to the cause of the petitioner's left knee 
condition" as the basis of his contention that the case should have been referred to 
a medical panel. Point II of his argument section, which is where he addresses his 
contention that there was a conflicting medical opinion regarding causation, deals 
entirely with the opinions of doctors Gordon and Zeluff concerning the cause of 
his left knee injury. 
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agency's rules unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. Thus, we will overturn the agency's 
interpretation only if that interpretation is an abuse of discretion. 
Brown, 947 P.2d at 677 (citations omitted). 
Benson's entire argument concerning the necessity of a medical panel 
arises from a paragraph in the ALJ's findings of fact in which she states that "Dr. 
Gordon disagreed with Dr. Zeluff as to the cause of the petitioner's left knee 
condition." (R. Vol. 1 at 69). It relies entirely on notes Dr. Gordon took 
concerning an office visit Benson made in July of 2000. The disagreement 
concerning the cause of Benson's left knee condition is not significant, as required 
by R602-2-2, nor is it based on opinion or medical reports. 
Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own medical expert, performed an examination 
and submitted a medical report detailing his opinions concerning Benson's injuries. 
He clearly stated that he did not believe that Benson's left knee injury was related 
to his industrial accident. (R. Vol. 3 at 501, 503.) 
On the other hand, the document upon which Benson relies to claim a 
significant difference of opinion concerning causation is a brief memo in Dr. 
Gordon's records detailing Benson's office visit on July 27, 2000. The doctor's 
note states that "[a]t this point, it appears that he has an irritation of the left knee 
probably aggravated from the abnormal gait from his right foot injury. Would 
recommend getting an MRI of the left knee to rule out a lateral meniscus tear." (R. 
Vol. 2 at 157.) This document was clearly not meant as a statement of Dr. 
Gordon's opinion concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury, nor was it a 
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medical report. Rather, it is a brief memo meant for Benson's file to remind Dr. 
Gordon of what was discussed during Benson's visit. His statement that "[a]t this 
point, it appears that he has an irritation of the left knee probably 
aggravated.. .from the right foot injury" is not language that suggests an opinion 
concerning causation, but rather appears to be a vague hypothesis that he intended 
to test with a recommended diagnostic procedure. 
Given the nature of the document and the extremely vague language that 
related Dr. Gordon's "opinion," the ALJ acted both reasonably and rationally by 
determining that Dr. Gordon's office note did not create a significant conflicting 
opinion in the face of Dr. Zeluff s clearly stated opinion contained in his medical 
report. As such, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by ruling on the question of 
causation without the assistance of a medical panel. 
D. Even if the Opinions of Doctors Zeluff and Gordon Constitute 
Conflicting Medical Opinions with Regard to the Cause of Benson's 
Left Knee Injury, Such Conflict is Irrelevant to Benson's Claims. 
In order to prove permanent total disability, the petitioner must show that 
the industrial injury caused total disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b). 
If the petitioner cannot show that the injury caused total disability, the claim for 
permanent disability fails and the cause of the injury, whether medically disputed 
or not, is simply irrelevant. 
Benson's focus on the Commission's failure to utilize a medical panel to 
determine the cause of his left knee injury is misplaced, given that Benson himself 
has acknowledged that his left knee injury was not the cause of his alleged total 
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disability. At the evidentiary hearing, Benson testified that he is disabled mainly 
due to sleep problems caused by "nervous legs" and cognitive difficulties related 
to an assortment of medications he takes, not because of his knee injury. (R. Vol. 
4 at 26, 42.) Benson has not proved that his sleep problems or cognitive 
difficulties are related in any way to his left knee injury. 
Benson states that his sleep problems are caused by "nervous legs," a 
condition that makes both of his legs "flip uncontrollably" at night. (R. Vol. 4 at 
26.) He has made various vague statements suggesting that his nervous legs are 
related to his left knee injury, but has not presented any medical evidence 
demonstrating a connection between his twitching legs and his left knee injury. 
Additionally, he has not shown how or why his left knee injury could have caused 
nervous leg syndrome in both of his legs. 
Similarly, Benson testified that he has been on "dozens and dozens" of 
different medications. (R. Vol. 4 at 28.) However, he has not specified which 
medications he believes caused his cognitive problems, nor has he submitted any 
medical evidence to prove that his cognitive difficulties are a result of any of the 
dozens of medications he has been on, or that any such medications were 
necessitated by his left knee injury. 
In the end, the cause of Benson's left knee injury is totally irrelevant 
because he has not shown that the injury stopped him from performing his job 
duties at Lucent. The job in question is a "white collar" desk job that would be 
well suited for any person who lacked full mobility, including individuals using 
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crutches or a wheelchair. Simply put, a fully functional left knee was not a 
requirement for his job. 
In summary, Benson has failed to prove that his left knee injury kept him 
from performing his duties at Lucent, or that the conditions he believes prevented 
him from performing his duties, his sleep problems and cognitive difficulties, were 
related in any way to his left knee injury. As such, his left knee injury is irrelevant 
to his permanent total disability claim because it did not cause a total disability. 
Where the injury is irrelevant, the question of causation, whether medically 
disputed or not, need not be determined by a medical panel. Accordingly, 
Benson's insistence that the ALJ should have convened a medical panel is without 
basis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Lucent asks this Court to affirm the decision of 
the Labor Commission. Specifically, this Court should find that the ALJ and the 
Labor Commission did not abuse their discretion by relying on the medical records 
exhibit as it existed at the time of the evidentiary hearing, and by not convening a 
medical panel to examine the causation of Benson's left knee symptoms. 
DATED this V^ day of January, 2007. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Mark 
Eric K. Jenkins 
Attorneys for Lucent Technologies 
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ADDENDUM A 
DETERMANITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413Q): 
(l)(a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident 
or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in 
this section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee must prove by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of 
impairments as a result of the industrial accident or occupational disease 
that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of 
the employee's permanent total disability. 
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that 
limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of 
impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions 
of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the 
time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for 
the employee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking 
into consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; and 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than 
those provided under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, if relevant: 
(i) may be presented to the commission; 
(ii) is not binding; and 
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601: 
(l)(a)The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case 
described in this Subsection (l)(a) to a medical panel appointed by an 
adminislrative law judge 
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the 
course of employment for: 
(A) disability by accident; or 
(B) death by accident; and 
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability. 
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel appointed by an 
administrative law judge upon the filing of a claim for compensation based 
upon disability or death due to an occupational disease. 
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more 
physicians specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in 
the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of 
the medical aspects of a controverted case, the division may employ a medical 
director or one or more medical consultants: 
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and 
(ii) for the purpose of: 
(A) evaluating the medical evidence; and 
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the 
administrative law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility. 
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical 
consultants, the medical director or one or more medical consultants shall be 
allowed to function in the same manner and under the same procedures as 
required of a medical panel. 
(2)(a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the 
following to the extent the medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable: 
(i) conduct a study; 
(ii) take an x-ray; 
(iii) perform a test; or 
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem 
examination. 
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make: 
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed 
by the Division of Adjudication; and 
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require. 
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(b), a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant 
shall certify to the administrative law judge: 
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work 
for remuneration or profit; 
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the 
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the 
occupational disease; and 
(iii)(A) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, 
or in any way contributed to the disability or death; and 
(B) if another cause has contributed to the disability or death, the extent 
in percentage to which the other cause has contributed to the disability 
or death. 
(d)(i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a 
report submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by 
certified mail with return receipt requested to: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; and 
(C) the employees insurance carrier. 
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is 
deposited in the United States post office, the following may file with the 
administrative law judge written objections to the report: 
(A) the applicant; 
(B) the employer; or 
(C) the employees insurance carrier. 
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the period described in 
Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence. 
(e)(i) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's 
finding and decision on the report of: 
(A) a medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) one or more medical consultants. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge is not 
bound by a report described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary finding. 
(f)(i) If an objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the 
administrative law judge may set the case for hearing to determine the facts 
and issues involved. 
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may 
request the administrative law judge to have any of the following present at 
the hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) the chair of the medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) the one or more medical consultants. 
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order the 
following to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination: 
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the 
medical panel; 
(B) the medical director; or 
(C) a medical consultant. 
(g)(i) The written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more 
medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing described in 
Subsection (2)(f). 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report received as an exhibit 
under Subsection (2)(g)(i) may not be considered as evidence in the case 
except as far as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted. 
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay 
out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund established in Section 34A-2-702: 
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, 
or medical consultant; and 
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical 
consultant's appearance before the administrative law judge. 
(i)(i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall 
pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 
the expenses of: 
(A) the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultant; and 
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's 
appearance before the administrative law judge. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in 
Subsection (2)(i)(i) shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
whether or not the employment relationship during which the industrial 
accident or occupational disease occurred is localized in Utah as described 
in Subsection 34A-2-704(20). 
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-UH): 
H. Medical Records Exhibit. 
1. The parties are expected to exchange medical records during the 
discovery period. 
2. Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records contained in his/her 
possession to the respondent for the preparation of a joint medical records 
exhibit at least twenty (20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing. 
3. The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record exhibit containing 
all relevant medical records. The medical record exhibit shall include all 
relevant treatment records that tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue. 
Hospital nurses' notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials 
need not be included in the medical record exhibit. 
4. The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical 
care provider in chronological order and bound. 
5. The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent shall be delivered 
to the Division and the petitioner or petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) 
working days prior to the hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not 
be admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or 
for good cause shown. 
6. The administrative law judge may require the respondent to submit an 
additional copy of the joint medical record exhibit in cases referred to a 
medical panel. 
7. The petitioner is responsible to obtain radiographs and diagnostic films 
for review by the medical panel. The administrative law judge shall issue 
subpoenas where necessary to obtain radiology films. 
Utah Administrative Code R602-2-2: 
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the following 
guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where one or 
more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
1. Conflicting medical opinions related to causation of the injury or disease; 
2. Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary more than 5% of the whole person, 
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which 
vary more than 90 days; 
4. Conflicting medical opinions related to a claim of permanent total 
disability, and/or 
5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $10,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there is 
a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the 
medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting 
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-
submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be 
examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to 
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment rating, 
and/or 
2. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical 
consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for 
further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers1 Fund, as directed by 
Section 34A-2-601. 
